The Role of 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) during Desert Storm

By MSG William A. "Congo" Easterling

Author's Notes: August 02, 1990.  I was in the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence course at Ft Bragg, NC.  This is an exceptionally long and grueling course designed to allow the senior enlisted and Warrant Officers in the SF units a way to become very smart on the ways of planning combat operations on a very large scale and in very thorough detail along with, or in spite of, conventional units in our own and allied nations. 

On 02 August 1990, in Kuwait, on the other half of the world, Iraqi tanks were moving and my destiny was being redesigned so that I might be able to put to use in the "real world" the knowledge and experience I was gaining in
the classroom and field training exercises in the Sand Hills of North Carolina. The following is an article I wrote several years ago concerning the events that I, and my unit went through during the times we remember as Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. 

This story has not been all-inclusive, but it contains all of the major documented missions that were performed by the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) during Operation Desert Storm.

  Thanks to General Toney and many other soldiers of the unit for information I collected from your written interviews and after action reports. Thanks also to the JFK historical records section where I found most of the documents I used while preparing this report.

PS: August 02 is also my birthday.  What a present.

  I decided to write an article on the accomplishments of the men who were assigned to the 3rd SFG(A) to enlighten the new soldiers and help the older ones still around to remember what was actually conducted by a brand new unit
that was ordered into combat.  I had the honor and privilege of being a young Team Sergeant on an Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) during the campaign.  I was assigned to Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion.

  On the second of August 1990, the Iraqi military invaded Kuwait. The drive swept through Kuwait City and pushed the Kuwaiti Army all the way into Saudi Arabia.  The United States started deploying units into Saudi Arabia on what
was called Operation Desert Shield.    3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) had three teams deploy almost
immediately, along with the 5th SFG(A), into Saudi Arabia to work primarily as liaison between the US VII Corps units and the Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT).

  3rd SFG(A) was still being filled as a new Special Forces Group and at the time consisted of a group headquarters and one battalion, the 1st BN.  Our unit was first notified that the remainder we would deploy to Saudi around
September, 90.  5th SFG(A), which was on the ground and working with SOCCENT had determined the Special Operations element could use another battalion of SF-ODAs and another headquarters element for missions and planning.

  This first notification was soon followed by the message that the rest of 3rd Group would not deploy, at least not yet.  This on-again, off-again notification continued and switched about every 2 to 3 weeks.  Our BN had many other peacetime operations that were being conducted and demanded the concentration of our people, so these training missions were given priority over the possibility of deploying to Saudi anytime soon.  It was our opinion that the training we were conducting, no matter what it was, would help prepare us, as a unit, for any combat mission we might get if we did deploy.

   We were a new group, but the majority of the personnel at the team level and in command were experienced Special Forces soldiers. Also most of us had been together as a unit for a long time already as members of the 3d BN, 5th SFG(A).  It was that unit which was used as the nucleus when 3rd SFG(A) was brought on line in June of 1990.  Because of this, the majority of the personnel were highly trained in various combat and survival operations in a desert environment.

  As the Christmas season approached, we were fairly confident that we would not be leaving soon, if at all.  The commander authorized most of the BN to take Christmas holiday vacation.  That's when the rumors started that we were to deploy right away.  A few of the key personnel returned early and began planning for a deployment to Saudi with the exact nature of the mission still being an unknown part of the equation.

  As we entered the new year, everyone now was sure we were going and bags were being packed.

  On January 17 1991, we were in the company having a Team Sergeants and Team leaders meeting with the Company Commander. During the meeting someone called and said to turn on the TV or radio.  When we did we saw pictures of Baghdad, Iraq getting bombed by the coalition Air Forces.  No more guessing games,  Operation Desert Storm had begun.

  The next few days passed in a maddening bustle of activity while everyone finished getting the final things done.  Then on 20 January 91, we were officially alerted that we were to deploy to Saudi Arabia in support of Desert Storm.  The advance party left Fort Bragg on 24 January and the main body departed Ft. Bragg on the 27th of January.

  Once we arrived in Saudi, we stayed at the King Fahd International Airport (KFIA).  It was still under construction and had the runways and some of the buildings completed.  The main terminal had not been completed but 5th SFG(A)
was living and working out of the basement portion. 

  3rd SFG(A) moved into the second level of an adjoining parking garage.  This is where we lived, trained and planned our operations for the next 3 weeks.  The training continually changed focus as our missions were adjusted
and narrowed by the higher headquarters.

  3rd SFG(A) began the operation with a dual tasking.  Our missions were tied into two main portions of the conflict.  First was the mission within Iraq itself.  This was broken down into two sub-missions.  The first being to conduct reconnaissance missions of the enemy in the US VII Corps sector of Iraq to determine the Iraqi's intent and provide an early warning to the VII Corps.  The second submission was to conduct additional reconnaissance
missions into southeastern Iraq to determine whether the terrain would support movement of the armored vehicles in the projected area of operations for VII Corps.
 
   The second proposed mission was for inside the country of Kuwait.  This mission statement basically directed 3rd SFG(A) to prepare to coordinate with the Kuwaiti Army General Headquarters and establish a combined Special
Operations Headquarters to provide a connection between units of the Special Operation Forces, Kuwaiti resistance forces and allied conventional forces.  Also to assist in the clearing and securing of Kuwait City.

  The purpose of the dual missions was to support the coalition forces Desert Storm plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia and for the recapture and restructuring of Kuwait and Kuwait City.

  Operation Desert Storm had an annex, or sub-operation plan that was titled "Operation Urban Freedom".  This OPLAN began implementing actions that were to be conducted around Kuwait City to ensure the orderly forward deployment of the Special Operations Central Command forces.  Also this plan would allow a smooth flow of the coalition forces, which were primarily U.S. Marines and Kuwaiti forces into the area to assist in the liberation of Kuwait City.

 The commander's intent was to deploy SOCCENT forces forward to the vicinity of Kuwait City as the conventional coalition force secured Kuwait up to the 6th ring road of Kuwait City.  Kuwait City is surrounded by circular roads
that encompass the city center which is bordered by the gulf on the east and north edges.

 Once the conventional forces had cleared up to the 6th Ring Road, a joint task force composed of Kuwaiti forces and the SOCCENT forces were to clear and secure the city.

  The U.S. task force personnel would assist and advise the Kuwaiti forces throughout the liberation of Kuwait City and would occupy the U.S. Embassy in a coordinated effort to occupy several embassies simultaneously, by different
country's Special Operations forces. 

  Specific 3rd SFG(A) missions that were proposed in support of the mission in Iraq included:

• Direct Action missions; Rear area lines of communication, Main supply routes, command and control facilities, and mobile targets not easily destroyed by air assets.
• Strategic Reconnaissance missions; Hidden airfields, high value enemy
  strategic targets, command and control nodes, and early warning.
• Combat Search and Rescue missions, Primarily in southern Iraq.
•  Foriegn Internal Defense missions, In Saudi Arabia.

Specific 3rd SFG(A) missions in support of the mission in Kuwait and Kuwait City included:

• On order, forward deploy forces to Kuwait International Airport and establish
  a forward operational base. 
• Be prepared to link up with resistance forces to conduct combined operations. 
• Be prepared to assist resistance in utilization of Close Air Support, (CAS).
• Be prepared to support link up of resistance forces with coalition forces.
• Be prepared to secure designated key facilities in Kuwait City in coordination with Coalition and/or U.S. forces.
• Be prepared to assist in the conduct of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations beyond the capabilities of other forces. 
• Be prepared to conduct Combat Search and Rescue. 
• Be prepared to accept operational control of a Kuwaiti Special Forces Battalion. 
• On order, secure and occupy the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City. 
• On order, assume command, less OPCON, of 4/17 Cavalry. 

These were all the scenarios and missions the commander of Special Operations Central Command had envisioned could be given to the 3rd SFG(A).  This is what we began to prepare and plan for during the initial few days after arriving in Saudi.  
 
  The highlights are now covered on what the 3rd SFG(A) actually conducted once the missions began:

   The 3rd SFG(A) conducted the initial two missions, however the focus was narrowed quite a bit.  First the Reconnaissance teams went deep behind enemy lines inside Iraq.  This was in support of the US VII Corps.  The
Reconnaissance teams' missions were two-fold.  First they were to find the Iraqi Republican Guard Army and their respective divisions.  Secondly, when the attack kicked off in February, they were to determine whether the Republican Guards Divisions were going to come south and meet the VII Corps attack, if they were going to head west to Baghdad, or whether they were going to remain in position.

  The second mission, inside Kuwait, was also narrowed considerably.  This mission was restated directing 3rd SFG(A) to seize, clear, and hold the U.S. Embassy until relieved.

  To accomplish the first mission, several teams began to experiment with different types of desert hide sites and techniques to remain hidden.  Due to the variance of terrain many ideas were tested.  Some of these included using
plastic pipe covered by various types of cloth material, sandbags, digging holes, and hiding in whatever terrain was available.

  Three teams actually went inside Iraq.  Two teams stayed until their mission was complete and one had to be extracted almost immediately due to an enemy tank unit in the area.  There was no loss of personnel or equipment on
these missions.  They were infilled and exfilled by helicopters that came from either US Army or Air Force Special Operations Assets.

  The mission in Kuwait City began with the Commander, LTC Frank J. Toney reorganizing the battalion into a special task force.  He divided the three companies of the battalion into an assault force, a security force, and a support force.  There was very little time to get ready.  We had less than 1 week from receipt of the mission to receive required intelligence, develop an assault plan, conduct rehearsals and then, actually launch on the mission.

  The rehearsals took place at King Fahd International Airport area.  Then the unit moved by helicopter to the Kuwait International Airport (KIA).  When the force landed at KIA there was little to no resistance.  The force stayed at KIA for the night, then launched for the US embassy by wheel and helicopter the next morning.  This was 28 February 1991.  The US embassy was cleared, and then was turned over to the U.S. ambassador on the next day.    

   During this portion of the operation, the lack of accurate and timely intelligence was a major concern of the force.  We had been told to expect to find anything from a reinforced mechanized infantry company with chemical and
conventional munitions, to finding no threat at all.  Because of this, the task force went in wearing chemical protective suits that were very hot and could easily have created heat injuries.  The leaders were aware of this but were trying to protect their soldiers by lowering the number of possible casualties for any situation.  Also the water, ammunition, and anti-tank weapons the men were carrying created a rucksack that weighed more than 120 pounds or 55-60 KG and a combat vest weighing around 70 pounds or 30 KG.  Everyone was also wearing flak jackets or body armor, helmets, and carrying protective masks.  This made the individual soldier's load very heavy and would have been very difficult to maneuver with had the enemy chose to fight.

  Due to smoke from the oil wells that were burning all around Kuwait, visibility was extremely limited.  The wind shifted after the US Embassy had been entered and within an hour it was dark as midnight, even though it was
still midday.  This made the job of securing the Embassy slightly more challenging and the shadows created problems where there should not have been any.  The embassy compound was not defended nor had it any enemy troops inside. Reports received about booby traps, left from both the Iraqi's and the US personnel as they evacuated the embassy, coupled with the urgency for speed in clearing the facilities, created an environment that allowed some
demolition and searching operations to take place that caused significant damage to portions of the compound.  However, the commander said he needed to be sure it was safe for embassy personnel to return.  Upon completion of the securing of the embassy, our mission shifted to embassy guard and VIP security.  At the same time we began planning for reestablishing some kind of order in Kuwait City.

  As most people know, the ground war only lasted a "magic" 100 hours, or 4 days.  This was not expected or planned for and there were no plans conceived yet for the reorganization and rebuilding of the infrastructure of Kuwait City.

   We had several challenges, even though it wasn't part of our Mission Essential Task List (METL), or part of our directed mission.  Suddenly we needed to get water and electricity back into the embassy and to help make possible the eventual return of these products to the entire city.  We maintained and helped control food lines and attempted to ensure human rights violations didn't occur. Several times, teams were sent to police stations to prevent or stop atrocities that were being committed against suspected Iraqi stay behinds, sympathizers, and Palestinians. Palestinians composed the major part of the work force in Kuwait and many belonged to or were sympathetic with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), but the majority of them were still loyal to Kuwait or at least were not supportive of what the Iraqi Army had done.  Many Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) missions were performed on stockpiles of ammo, booby traps, and land mines.  This was compounded by the massive amounts of unexploded air ordinance left from the intensive bombings prior to the ground war that was literally scattered everywhere.

  The Commander once again broke the battalion down by company and gave the mission of guarding the embassy and providing VIP security to B Company, he gave the Eastern area command to A Company and the Northern area command to C Company.  The Northern area command included the mission of sending one Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) north of Kuwait City near the border, to work with a Kuwaiti armor brigade.  This unit was right in the middle of US VII Corps armor units.  Deconflicting the problems between the Kuwaiti unit and the US unit was an ongoing problem for the Detachment Commander.  The main problems came from the conventional officers not being fully aware of the customs and cultural differences.  Also since the Kuwaiti Commander kept crossing into disputed territory or would maneuver his unit into the US element's area of operations in pursuit of Iraqis, suspected or otherwise, matters were not made any easier.

  The other teams in C Company and the ones in A Company set up headquarters elements alongside their Kuwaiti counterparts at the division level and sent teams to Kuwaiti military and police outposts throughout the city.  Once
deployed, they continued to help organize a system of control and perform Explosive Ordinance Disposal and quick reaction force missions.  As munitions caches were found, or small attacks via sniping or drive by shootings would
occur, we responded along side our assigned Kuwaiti units. During the first week after securing the embassy and these other operations had begun, we conducted numerous Direct Action and information collection missions
throughout the city.  Some of these missions included the following:

The Kuwaiti government experimental farm, used as a major Iraqi interrogation and torture center.  War crime evidence was gathered and preserved. 

• The Al Shaab Palace, Iraqi interrogation and torture center.
• The Sief Palace, Iraqi interrogation and torture center.  It produced major war crime evidence. 
• The Muk Harbaratt HQ's, it was utilized as the Iraqi command and control HQ's for Iraqi intelligence soldiers.  It produced critical information on their military operations and war crime evidence.
•  Several police stations, used by Iraqis as interrogation and torture centers.
• The Kuwaiti women's prison was used as an interrogation and torture center.  It produced war crime evidence and documentation. 
• PLO HQ's, it provided information on command and control of terrorists and military organizations that were loyal to the Iraqis and supported them during the occupation of Kuwait City.  It also produced plans, terrain models, names, passports and Counter-intelligence (CI) documentation. 
• The ice skating rink, it was used by Iraqis as a morgue. It provided information and bodies bearing evidence of the torture techniques the Iraqis used. 
• All colleges and university dormitories and classrooms were used as living and working areas by Iraqis.  They produced many documents, weapons and ammunition caches. 
• Hotels and residences, used as working and living spaces by Iraqis.  Many of the hotels were burnt down.  These produced some documentation, weapons and ammo. 
• Beach trench and bunker complexes produced many anti-aircraft and artillery weapons, small arms and ammo.  This entire area was extensively mined and contained some booby traps. 

  As we started to bring the city under control, we were assisting the Kuwaitis more and conducting missions less.  We were prepared to stay in Kuwait City for 3 to 6 months and continue with the stabilization mission.  Then abruptly on 12 April 91, to the surprise of our commander and our Kuwaiti counterparts, we were ordered to redeploy to the United States.  5th SFG(A) then stepped in and assisted the Kuwaitis we had been working with.  The 5th SFG(A) still maintains an element in Kuwait City to this day.  On the 26th of April the main body of the 3rd SFG(A) returned to the United States.