DR. WRIGHT: And that platoon is part on the TOE [Table of Organization
and Equipment] of Headuarters and Headquarters Company?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: I assume you were not made aware of Operation JUST
CAUSE prior to the operation going dow?
1LT JOHNSON: No.
DR. WRIGHT: Did you, however, start getting intensely suspicious
by the news of the events that were transpiring that weekend previous--with
the shooting incident? Did you start getting a little concerned
about possibilities?
1LT JOHNSON: Actually, the first time we knew of certain possibilities
was when ... I believe it was an DRE [Emergency Deployment Readiness
Exercise] called the BLACK KNIGHT or something similar to that that
was executed by the 3d Brigade, [82d Airborne Division]. I had the
opportunity to jump on that operation and to see the basic scenario
of the three task force with three separate targets.
DR. WRIGHT: You went along as one of the observers on that one?
1LT JOHNSON: Basically observing the operation, yes, sir. And from
there we knew there was a basic OPLAN [operations plan]. And a few
days prior to assuming mission ... we assumed DRF-2 [Division Ready
Force 2, the second battalion in alert order]. The Battalion S-3
briefed the company commanders and myself and a few other key personnel
on the OPLAN: basically three battalions in with separate objectives,
and basically concentrating on the air assault operations, because
that was something that the battalion was never really good at.
I don't think too many battalions on the street are that good at
night air assault operations. We wanted to have us all seriously
look at that.
So we knew at that point there was some serious planning going
on. And the activities that went on that weekend prior, down in
Panama, with the incidences with killings and everything pretty
much gave me an idea that if something was going to happen.
DR. WRIGHT: That's where you were going?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Morning of December 18th, that Monday, post is about
to launch into half-day schedules. Because your battalions about
to assume DRF-1, you don't have to worry about guys vanishing off
on leave and stuff like that. You know you're going to have your
platoon pretty much intact?
1LT JOHNSON: Exactly. We started the day with PT [physical
training] as usual, and we were doing someclose-in training, basically
reviewing some of the battalion level tasks that we needed to work
on based on the EXEVAL [external evaluation] we had in November.
Basically just classroom type stuff. Even though we had come back
for a 09[00] formation, at which time I was notified that we were
alerted.
Immediately we started drawing sensitive items and weapons. Our
platoon, we store all our deployment bags and field gear in our
CP [command post] during mission cycle, so we had it all there.
Pulled it out into our formation area; squad leaders went through
one last lay-out and inspected. The weapons were basically drawn
within an hour's time. And by the time I was going down to battalion
for--I believe it was an M-plus 130 brief, the IS3--the platoon
was ready to move to the PHA. There really were no hitches. It was
like all the EDREs we've done.
DR. WRIGHT: Just the standard ... . Everything went according
to plan? Yesterday MAJ [Jonathan] Chase [the battalion
S-3] indicated that the battalion has a policy to ensure
that you get the right weight of uniform, whether the summer
weight or the winter weight BDUs [battle dress uniform].
Did your platoon have that as well, the notion that you
got ... he just put out the word "summer," or you
take the summer bag or take the winter bag and you can just
pull the two bags apart and take whichever one you need.
1LT JOHNSON: Within the platoon we have modified the gear for one
packing list and almost everybody will normally wear lightweights
due to the fact that almost every country on the division's 'top
ten' is ...
DR. WRIGHT: ... is a warm one?
1LT JOHNSON: And within the bag we have a separate bag for heavyweight
BDUs and the cold weather gear.
DR. WRIGHT: The 'snivel gear?'
1LT JOHNSON: Right. But we left that in the bags knowing that we
were going to go to the PHA [Personnel Holding Area] and the weather
was inclement here at Fort Bragg at the time. And we prfer to make
the switch ...
DR. WRIGHT: ... over in there?
1LT JOHNSON: In the PHA. And another thing that the platoon does
is, since we have a sniper squad which isn't in the TOE, and that
was one of the things we brought out in our after-action review
is ... . Getting back to what I was saying, we carry a lot to the
PHA due to the fact that different contingency missions. Snipers
may have a specific mission separate in the battalion where they
would need Ghillie suits [special camouflage], drag bags, some other
... spotting scopes, which are specific to a sniper mission, but
add a lot of weight if they're going to do a reconnaissance mission
rather than a sniper mission. So we, for deploying with this ...
[we take] all the gear we need for contingencies to the PHA. Once
we get the mission in PHA, that's where we make our cut.
DR. WRIGHT: And then you get somebody from a rear party that will
take it back?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the strength of the platoon on the morning
of the 18th, pretty much how were you internally organized and who
were your key people?
1LT JOHNSON: O.K., by TOE the battalion scout platoon has three
five-man reconnaissance squads, but our division policy is that
the battalion sniper squad, which is not in the TOE from the Army,
is part of the scout platoon.
DR. WRIGHT: And that's taken out of hide, taken out of the battalion
hide?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. And someone may hear this. It's a serious problem
because all of its personnel are listed as excess on the TOE, and
they continually come out on levy--shipped here or there--because
they are listed as excess. And if anything, they're the most highly
trained infantry soldiers within the battalion. So ...
DR. WRIGHT: And these are fellows that have gone through the training
programs over at MTU-1 [Marksmanship Training Unit 1], or is there
a division sniper school?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir. There's an Army sniper school at Fort Benning.
And the SODEC sniper school which is a highly developed sniper school
run by Special Operations here at Fort Bragg.
DR. WRIGHT: So, you get all your people through that and then they're
what? The M-24 system or the M-21 system?
1LT JOHNSON: The M-24, sir. It's organized into three sniper teams,
two men per team, per sniper team.
DR. WRIGHT: What: a shooter and a security [man]?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir. Its basic that security deployed with an
M-16. Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: So you had, then, what--about six plus fifteen--about
twenty-one people? Plus yourelf and your RTO [radio telephone operator],
and your first ... and platoon sergeant?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. Our strength at time of deployment was one
[officer] and twenty-four [enlisted personnel].
DR. WRIGHT: Who was your platoon sergeant?
1LT JOHNSON: He's SFC Serrano.
DR. WRIGHT: First name?
1LT JOHNSON: Angel, sir
DR. WRIGHT: O.K. [INTERRUPTION] We were talking about the
strength. You have yourself, the platoon sergeant, you have
an RTO, and that is your command element. And then ... ?
1LT JOHNSON: Well ... also we take a medic from the [Headquarters
Company] Medic[al] Platoon in our command element also.
DR. WRIGHT: And then your three sniper teams ... your three recon
teams are all under E-6s [staff sergeants]?
1LT JOHNSON: E-6s, yes sir. Do you want the names?
DR. WRIGHT: Yes, if you don't mind.
1LT JOHNSON: SSG John T. Nikolas, SSG Randy T. Rhodes, and SSG
Alex Smolden.
DR. WRIGHT: And then your sniper teams are all composed of what,
E-4s [specialists], E-5s [sergeants]?
1LT JOHNSON: The E-5 team leader, the senior team leader, the sniper
employment officer is SGT Darren McAllister. He is in charge, yes
sir.
DR. WRIGHT: When you normally would operate would you cross- attach
your snipers to put a team with each one of your recon elements
under sort of average conditions?
1LT JOHNSON: Almost ... I'd say eighty percent of the missions
that's how we're used because we get a ... the platoon just gets
a reconnaissance mission, not a reconnaissance and a sniper mission.
DR. WRIGHT: Within your equipment, do you have any wheel transport
or are you dependent on others?
1LT JOHNSON: We have no ...
DR. WRIGHT: You walk everywhere?
1LT JOHNSON: Exactly, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: So, then the issue of heavy drop platforms as far as
it ... you could have cared less?
1LT JOHNSON: Exactly, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: You got over to PHA at about what time on the 18th?
1LT JOHNSON: We were one of the first units to move over there
and arrive ... and I really do not recall, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Before lunch?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: O.K. What's the state of mind of your people as they
get over there? Do they pretty much all feel that this is real,
or were you getting grousing about why does the division pick this
time of year to do something like that with this kind of miserable
weather?
1LT JOHNSON: No, they were all ready for it to be real and we normally
get a real in-depth brief on the S-2 separate from the other elements.
So, we all knew something was going on. Originally when we were
briefed it was, you know, an EDRE to Sicily [Drop Zone, Fort Bragg],
and a lot of people in the platoon were hearing more of that side
from other personnel in the battalion. I was trying to tell them
that, you know, well, we're not getting jerked around, we're really
going. So, they were prepared for it. But there wasn't any apprehension,
no nervousness.
DR. WRIGHT: When did they get told, and you get told, [that] this
is real, we're going to Panama, and lift off is on the 19th?
1LT JOHNSON: I don't remember being exactly told, but after the
N plus 2 brief, when the [S]-3 and the colonel [LTC Harry B. Axson]
came back and they both came in to the battalion conference room--this
was before anybody went to the PHA--and said we were briefed on
this EDRE to Sicily, but they were both holding a map of Panama
in their hand. I knew at that point that ... so, sir, I never really
recall being told this is it.
DR. WRIGHT: You, specifically. You get over to PHA, you start doing
the special equipment draw, like the mosquito repellant and things
like that?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. Our draws were that evening and there was
some problem as far as not having some of the things that we would
prefer going into a tropical environment, but all the air items
were there and that's basically ...
DR. WRIGHT: ... the key thing. Ammo draw?
1LT JOHNSON: O.K., sir, on the ammo that was another key point
in our AAR. [The problem] was [that] the ammo allocated in the ASOP
[Airborne Operations Standing Operations Procedure] for the IA [individual
issue of ammunition] cards is not a realistic depiction of what
we would tactically want to carry. And we have submitted suggestions
to try to change that. A better time to get exactly what's on an
IA card.
DR. WRIGHT: I've had people explain to me that, yeah, everything
was done with the initial ammo issue cards, but if you stood there
and said, 'hey, I really need X' [that] you could get it.
1LT JOHNSON: We went back and tried to adjust as much as possible.
DR. WRIGHT: What did you actually wind up taking?
1LT JOHNSON: It would be hard to say because the snipers would
draw something totally different from the remainder, sir, but on
the average a basic load of 5.56[mm M-16 ammunition] ...
DR. WRIGHT: 180 [round of ball ammunition] plus thirty [rounds
of] tracer?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. We went back and tried to get more tracer
because we prefer a higher amount. And doctrinally in FM [Field
Manual] 23-9 they tell you to have at least a five to one or four
to one ratio, and you can't do that with 180 and 30.
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah. And the idea there being that you intersperse
your rounds so that you can mark your own fire?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. In our break contact drill, since we're
such a small element we need to know where ... if someone can't
see the target [then] the others need to go in on his fire because
we're a small element and we need to get a mass ... everybody needs
to be firing.
DR. WRIGHT: The snipers carry 7.62[mm] ammo in what quantity?
1LT JOHNSON: O.K., sir, one thing to note on that is normally
when we fire here at Fort Bragg we get M-118 special ball ammunition.
However, when we got the pallets from PHA, the ammo was 7.62 match
ammo, which ... they are manufactured by different personnel and
I think the grain and the bullet are the same. But when you are
talking of sniper shot, anything does ...
DR. WRIGHT: It doesn't take much to throw it off? Yeah.
1LT JOHNSON: Right. That was a small point we brought out.
But we ended up deploying, sir, with 150 rounds of 7.62[mm] per
sniper system.
DR. WRIGHT: Pyrotechnics, smoke grenades; did you get those?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. We had, I would say, three to four smoke
grenades per team.
DR. WRIGHT: Mix of colors, or ... to be used for marking purposes
as opposed to obscurant?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. And one thing we noted was in the OPSKED
[operations schedule] that was issued--it was a pretty thorough
OPSKED with JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] units, other
units already down there, etc., etc. Sort of in the back there was
a standard list of, you know, purple smoke meaning this, this smoke
means that. What was listed in the CEOI [communications-electronics
operating instructions] ... you know, those things did not match
up with what you got. So ...
DR. WRIGHT: So you tried to do a little ... you tried to
do a little correction on the spot with that or did you just
suck it up?
1LT JOHNSON: We tried to, or we just came up within the platoon
what the colors would mean within the platoon if we needed to [use
them], sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Did you take any Claymores [M-18A1 antipersonnel mines]?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. We ... initially we had two per squad, and
then when we got down there we picked up some more and got up to
about three or four.
DR. WRIGHT: In terms of pistols, did anybody have pistols?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir, we were not assigned any. Which is another
point we bring out: by TOE the sniper is supposed to have a 9mm
[pistol] as a sidearm, because with the M-24 it's a bolt action.
He needs some sort of semi-automatic [weapon] in self-defense. In
HHC [Headquarters and Headquarters Company] everybody wants a pistol
rather than an M-16, so there's never enough to give everyone.
DR. WRIGHT: In terms of other automatic weapons, you don't ...
do you have any [M-249] SAWs [squad automatic weapons]?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir. We only have M-16s and four M-203s [grenade
launchers].
DR. WRIGHT: [M]-203 was primarily what, illum[ination rounds],
and HE [high explosive rounds], and what--some of the shotgun slugs?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir. We had thirty-six rounds HE and four rounds
of illumination for each [gunner].
DR. WRIGHT: And they had the vest to carry those in?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes.
DR. WRIGHT: Anything else in the way of special weapons that
you guys had? Special ammo that you needed?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: You mentioned the Ghillie suits and the drag bags.
Once you got over there and you got your mission, what were you
told on requirement for that stuff?
1LT JOHNSON: Well, sir, we did get a sniper mission, but we
determined not to deploy the Ghillies due to the fact that there
was an urban environment there.
DR. WRIGHT: O.K. And that leads me to my next question which
is, once you get the actual identification of the target and you
look at the map and you see Panama Viejo and you realize within
the brigade, if anybody is going into the city it looks like it
will be you guys. You've now got a situation where a scout element,
that we normally think of as being the guys furthest out in the
boondocks, suddenly look at going into an urban environment. How
much opportunity had you had to do MOUT [military operations on
urbanized terrain] training?
1LT JOHNSON: Well, we normally would execute in a MOUT operation
when the battalion would do it, which I would say would be, you
know, once every other ITC [training cycle]. And another thing that
we write up in AAR is the major deficiencies in the MOUT site here
at Fort Bragg. And the fact that it is so sterile a plain, as opposed
to what you are actually going to have in a MOUT environment, where
you have distractors: you have closets, furniture, vehicles, etc.
You know, even if you had gone to the MOUT site every week during
every ITC ...
DR. WRIGHT: It still wouldn't have prepared you?
1LT JOHNSON: Not necessarily, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Within the urban environment how, prior to the
operation, had you envisioned having to work with your scouts?
1LT JOHNSON: Prior to?
DR. WRIGHT: Prior to the operation. In other words, to establish
what you anticipated versus what actually happened.
1LT JOHNSON: More than likely we had anticipated manning OPs
[observation posts] to provide early warning within a MOUT environment,
or moving forward and establishing OPs to recon a section of an
urban environment that the battalion was going to attack.
DR. WRIGHT: And then using the snipers basically as counter-sniper.
1LT JOHNSON: Yeah.
DR. WRIGHT: And then in terms of your people, they spend a
lot of time training in a non-MOUT situation. Once you got them
in the PHA and you got the mission, did you start really trying
to refine on them and get them thinking about MOUT?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. We always have a certain number of rehearsals
which we go through which seem monotonous, but they are just the
basic movement and the break-contact drills we will go through.
But what we try to do on these, knowing that we were going into
a possible urban environment was to add ... you know, everyone has
an assigned sector to look at or fire into. To try to add another
dimension to it. When you're looking at a sector, you are also looking
up and down--at people, windows, on roofs. I suppose that is the
only one that I can think of right now.
DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the way your people sit there and get
ready. Do you have any impressions as the 18th blends into the 19th?
The state of mind that you people were in? It's fairly cold, as
I understand it, in the PHA?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. But as I said, we had deployed with
enough stuff to be comfortable in the PHA. You know, we just have
one tent. The battalion didn't issue its operation's order [OPORD]
during that evening. And I had issued a warning order when initially
I had gotten there, based on what I had seen on that EDRE, what
the [S]-3 had briefed us (the company commanders), and what I was
initially briefed by the S-2 as our actual objective going to be.
I gave them the warning order and then pretty much stood the team
down that evening and ...
DR. WRIGHT: ... told them to get some sleep?
1LT JOHNSON: And they were relaxed, they were confident, they
felt they couldn't get any more ready. During the evening ... .
And basically waiting for the battalion order to put out, I think
everybody knew what we were going to do because we knew what the
OPLAN was and we had talked about it so much, but we just sort of
kept putting off doing the order. The colonel drove us back to watch
a VCR tape of ... there was a film, there was an aerial film from
a helicopter ...
DR. WRIGHT: Of your objective area, flying back and forth from
the water area?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. It went all the way from Albrook [Air Station]
up the coast there past ... and then all the way up to Panama Viejo,
sir.
DR. WRIGHT: So, you had a pretty good idea then of what the
cuartel looked like that you were going to go into and you
got a pretty good idea of--better than the printed maps--of how
far the slum areas had encroached out into ...
1LT JOHNSON: I wouldn't say that we got a good idea of how
close the slum areas were in Panama Viejo from the aerial. The area
around Panama Viejo, the ruins itself, sir, has a lot of trees in
it, and that sort of masks some of the slum area that we ... . Or
at least I was under the impression that the map was very accurate
and that the slums didn't encroach that closely into the objective
area.
DR. WRIGHT: So, it was a little bit of a shocker then when
you realized that just how nasty it really was in terms of trying
to get your way through that stuff?
1LT JOHNSON: I wouldn't say that the environment was a shock
as much as the number of people in the street was what was shocked
us the most and finding out how to deal with them, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: O.K., on the evening of the 19th you start the
long walk over to Green Ramp. About what time does your platoon
move out?
1LT JOHNSON: We moved with all the other chalks that moved
out at the same time, sir. We all manifest ... I forget what time
final manifest call was, but it was still light out. It started
to drizzle or snow at that time. Most people probably told you that
the walk over there was really slow because there was a back-up
or backlog of everybody standing in line. I don't know what the
problem was on that or whether they were making decisions to go
ramp side or what.
DR. WRIGHT: What is your impression of the mood as they were
walking? A number of people told me various things that really stuck
in their mind at that particular moment, comparing it to a normal
EDRE?
1LT JOHNSON: I wouldn't say anything really stuck our minds.
The way we were cross-loaded, sir, we were all ... each element
was together on one chalk, so I was there with the Headquarters
element. We knew what our mission was and we knew we were ready.
We discussed some final contingencies in case we didn't get linked
up or something happened to somebody and we would have to pick up
those responsibilities on the DZ [drop zone].
DR. WRIGHT: I was thinking of things like guys had told me
that they could see ice forming on the guy in front of them. Guys
have told me that they thought it was just really weird that it
was, like, absolute quiet and you couldn't hear any .. none of the
usual clowning around and goofing around and stuff like that. Other
guys have told me, for example, they found the safeties not in their
normal behavior mode but rather actually trying to help people and
not yelling at people; helping guys rig-out and stuff like that.
And that all of those little things were clues to them that maybe
this one was going to be a little bit different than a regular EDRE.
You know, they start making believers of them.
1LT JOHNSON: I had said earlier, sir, our platoon ... we were
convinced that it was a go.
DR. WRIGHT: That it was a go?
1LT JOHNSON: And like I said we had heard from other people
in the other companies and soldiers were hearing that. We said we
know what our mission is and that's what we're doing. I was going
to say this before you mentioned that. But the only thing that really
bothered me on the walk over there was still hearing people in the
rifle companies saying that they thought this was just an EDRE and
you know it was going to suck being out on Sicily while there is
a lot of snow and, you know. We were ready, I think sir. That would
be the attitude.
DR. WRIGHT: Which chalk were you actually on?
1LT JOHNSON: I was on Chalk 2, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: And who else was on that chalk? Who were some of
the key players that you remember being on that chalk?
1LT JOHNSON: COL [Jack P.] Nix was on that Chalk.
DR. WRIGHT: The brigade command element?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, and if I remember correctly the Battalion
command sergeant major was on that Chalk. Or was that coming back
in? That was coming back here. Other than COL Nix ...
DR. WRIGHT: O.K., but that just sort of pins that down. Everybody
remembers who the ranking guy in the airplane was.
1LT JOHNSON: Correct, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Which door were you to come out of?
1LT JOHNSON: I was the first jumper right door, sir. Correction--that
was coming back. I was the fourth jumper right door.
DR. WRIGHT: O.K., and the platoon was cross-loaded across the
rest of the chalks?
1LT JOHNSON: We were on Chalks 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: And that is standard policy, standard ASOP policy
to cross-load so that if anything happens to any one of the aircraft
that you don't lose the whole element?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. We modify that depending on the mission
and on this mission we cross-loaded.
DR. WRIGHT: And you were told on the DZ the scouts' first mission
was to do what?
1LT JOHNSON: Our first mission was to assemble them and prepare
for the air assault. So, we didn't have any specific mission other
than being ready to go on air assault, specifically on the first
lift of the air assault, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the air assault down to Panama Viejo,
were you to go on ... all on one aircraft or were you cross loaded
within the helicopters?
1LT JOHNSON: Sir, we were cross-loaded because our element
was going to two different LZ's [landing zones]; a portion of the
platoon go to BOBCAT and the other portion go to the LZ LION.
DR. WRIGHT: And how did you divide up command and control?
Did you go to one LZ and have your platoon sergeant designated to
go to the other?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir. I keep the headquarters element as its
own entity. So, the headquarters element, 2nd and 3rd Squad[s] ...
DR. WRIGHT: Went to BOBCAT?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir. They went to LION, we went into LION.
And the 1st Squad and two sniper teams went into ...
DR. WRIGHT: BOBCAT.
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: And the idea there being that they put ... the
battalion commander wanted you on the more urban side, the side
closest to the city?
1LT JOHNSON: Well, sir, the reason I cross loaded that way
was [that we] had a mission of occupying three OPs which basically
covered the major routes coming into Panama Viejo; the bridges ...
DR. WRIGHT: And so that just put you ... LION put you closer
to the majority of those bridges?
1LT JOHNSON: Well, the 2nd and 3rd Squad had those two on the
western side.
DR. WRIGHT: What would be the western side; yeah.
1LT JOHNSON: And the 1st squad had a mission to the north,
northern entrance. And the reason I went into LION was just a judgment
call on my part where I felt I had better command and control in
that area with the headquarters element in case something happened.
DR. WRIGHT: And that's ... LTC Axon went to LION, and MAJ Chase
went to BOBCAT.
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: So, that's how they split that? O.K. You get on
the airplane, you loose rig or you do on-plane rigging? How do you
rig your chutes?
1LT JOHNSON: We do a loose rig by putting the parachute and
reserve on, ALICE [all-purpose, lightweight carrying equipment]
pack and weapon stored under the seat or behind the seat.
DR. WRIGHT: And then everybody sits down and is miserable and
freezing cold while you wait for the aircraft to take off?
1LT JOHNSON: Actually, that was another thing that we brought
out at our AAR was: if they are going to do a ramp side or plane
side issue and chute up, and you do have inclement weather, they
should run it ... they should prepare the aircraft just like its
going to be an in-flight rigging; which would be to put the pallet
of the parachutes on the rear ramp, and then you put everybody in
the aircraft, close the ramp, everybody puts their chutes on, and
once everyone is seated you just lower the ramp and take the pallet
off. And there's no one waiting out in the cold like we had to on
this one--where you would have everybody stand out behind the aircraft
and you could only get five or ten people on at a time. It took
close to two hours to get everybody loaded on.
DR. WRIGHT: And that would make your guys fairly ... were you
guys first off the aircraft, so were you first on the aircraft or
last on?
1LT JOHNSON: Last on.
DR. WRIGHT: So, it just doubles your misery quotient.
1LT JOHNSON: But, you know, sir, when you are asking ...
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah. The aircraft takes off about what time? Did
you have a chance to check your watch, get a time hack on that?
1LT JOHNSON: I didn't log the time hack for take-off, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: When you take off do you know that it is not all
twenty birds?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: So, you get to Panama and you realize suddenly,
whoops, this can't possibly be all twenty birds?
1LT JOHNSON: Pretty much once when I was on the ground and
I saw other sorties coming in, I knew that something had happened
to the hold on the aircraft. But I really wasn't too concerned knowing
that we were on that we were on the first six aircraft, and I assumed
that they would all get in. And plus I had radio contact from almost
all my elements.
DR. WRIGHT: Once you hit the ground?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: How many ... . That brings up a question. How many
radios do you have within the platoon?
1LT JOHNSON: O.K. This varies greatly from the TOE, but we
will carry six [AN]/PRC-77s and up to eight [AN]/PRC-126s. So almost
every sub-element ...
DR. WRIGHT: So, you have pretty much contact with everything.
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: And does the CEOI provide you with freq[uencie]s
so that you can have your own internal net?
1LT JOHNSON: We have our own internal net, yes sir.
DR. WRIGHT: And then you tie in externally to the O&I
[battalion operations and intelligence] net?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir. Battalion doesn't have an O&I,
so I will normally monitor the battalion command net.
It gives me direct access to the S-2 and the S-3, which are
usually collocated, or if necessary directly with the battalion
commander.
DR. WRIGHT: [Did] the flight down go pretty uneventful?
1LT JOHNSON: Very uneventful, sir. You know, it was just like
any other night jump.
DR. WRIGHT: Did you get a chance to get any sleep in?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Did your people? Subsequently have you learned
that most of your people were able to sleep, or were they running
on adrenaline?
1LT JOHNSON: I think most of them slept, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Did you have a chance to get any water on the aircraft
or did you have to go into your own canteens?
1LT JOHNSON: I really don't remember drinking or having a desire
to put down any water. We ensured that we all took off all of our
...
DR. WRIGHT: All the snivel [gear] was off before ... ?
1LT JOHNSON: I think so. If anything, people were probably
a little chilly. But I don't think anybody was worried about it.
DR. WRIGHT: Did you get a two-hour out warning?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: So, it was about what, twenty minutes out, ten
minutes out, what?
1LT JOHNSON: Well, I had been watching my watch to see when
we were going to get to, you know, when we were getting close to
TOT [time on target], and I believe we had the twenty-minute [warning]
twenty minutes prior to when we were supposed to have the TOT. Plus
we had gotten up to rig anyway, sir, so that got everybody up.
DR. WRIGHT: So then ... ?
1LT JOHNSON: Then everybody went back down; some people went
back to sleep. I believe we had twenty minutes when we were supposed
to have it, as compared to the TOT, but then we didn't get any of
the other jump commands until ...
DR. WRIGHT: Until it was reality, and at that point you know
that TOT is slipped.
1LT JOHNSON: Right, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: 'Stand up, hook up' comes when? Ten minutes out?
1LT JOHNSON: Just as normal, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: O.K.
1LT JOHNSON: We weren't standing for an excessive time. Just
one of those normal jump commands, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: About how much weight were you jumping, do you
estimate?
1LT JOHNSON: I carry a radio ...
DR. WRIGHT: Plus all your batteries?
1LT JOHNSON: ... and a secure device and extra batteries.
DR. WRIGHT: What kind of a secure device? TK or KY?
1LT JOHNSON: [KY]-57. Plus with that, with a Claymore and some
signaling devices, the ALICE pack was close to sixty pounds or seventy
pounds.
DR. WRIGHT: So, it's not impossible to stand up, but it's ...
you're starting to feel the weight.
1LT JOHNSON: That's how we normally train anyway. The only
excess weight was the ball ammunition and the extra Claymore. But
other than that we didn't have any extras, you know, clothing or
anything like that.
DR. WRIGHT: And you had been told five days and you'd be home?
1LT JOHNSON: That's what we had been told, yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: And packed accordingly.
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Door opens up ... . Oh, could you see out the window
as you make landfall or were you positioned where you couldn't see
anything?
1LT JOHNSON: No, I was not near a window. The only thing we
got in the aircraft was COL Nix, who had SECOMs [secure communications]
on his side, told us that the rangers had ... were working towards
their objective or had secured their objective. I don't remember
his exact words. And that enemy fire on the DZ was light. And [for]
everybody to have a good jump, and he'd see them on the DZ--words
of encouragement. That was the only information we had before the
jump.
DR. WRIGHT: Door comes open, you feel the temperature difference?
1LT JOHNSON: We expected it, but it wasn't anything that ...
it wasn't anything ... I had also gone into Honduras, so I
DR. WRIGHT: On [Operation] GOLDEN PHEASANT [in 1988]?
1LT JOHNSON: On GOLDEN PHEASANT. And that was a big ... you
really notice that one because it was during the day. But at night
I did not notice a tremendous temperature difference.
DR. WRIGHT: Green light comes on. Do you have a chance to check
your watch and get a time hack?
1LT JOHNSON: I had watched and I exited the aircraft at 0212.
DR. WRIGHT: What do you see as you come out the door?
1LT JOHNSON: Initially as I come out I see the chem[ical] lights
from the heavy drop. I thought, you know, 'I'm good to go' because
I saw the chem lights. And then once the 'chute opened I could see
to the left the airfield because it was all smooth and it was fairly
dark. And I could see below me ... starting to get the shapes of
dark areas and then I realized that I was over the trees.
DR. WRIGHT: Could you see any firing?
1LT JOHNSON: I saw a few tracers; very few, very far to the
north.
DR. WRIGHT: Green or blue ... green or red?
1LT JOHNSON: Red tracers.
DR. WRIGHT: Red tracers. Was there much moonlight? Do you remember?
1LT JOHNSON: I wanted to find ... I guess I would say at that
point there was only about twenty or thirty percent illumination.
DR. WRIGHT: Enough so that you could just barely see, but nothing
so you could see real clear?
1LT JOHNSON: Right, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: No twists or ties or turns?
1LT JOHNSON: No.
DR. WRIGHT: O.K. As you come down on the ground you've got
an understanding that you're probably west, too far west?
1LT JOHNSON: East.
DR. WRIGHT: Too far east?
1LT JOHNSON: I had seen the airfield to the west and I knew
I was in the trees or rough area east of the airfield.
DR. WRIGHT: So you touched down. Did you actually go into the
trees?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes. I don't even hit the ground. My toes are
almost ... are touching the ground. I am just sort of suspended
in, I can't really call it a tree, it was just a big ...
DR. WRIGHT: Bush?
1LT JOHNSON: ... bush or something.
DR. WRIGHT: So, you get out of the ... . Talk me through the
procedure of getting you out and then getting over to your assembly
area.
1LT JOHNSON: O.K. I had kept all my equipment on due to the
fact that I saw the trees and didn't want to lower my ruck[sack]
or lose any equipment, so I just took it all in. I didn't really
hit the ground, I was just suspended. Popped ... pulled the canopy
release assemblies; get my weapon out of the weapons case; dropped
my ALICE pack. My weapon was already in operation. Put the radio
in operation and I get a radio check with ... I can't really remember
who that personnel was that was up on the net ... but I do get a
radio check with one person. And police up my gear and leave it
where it is; shoot an azimuth to the west. And at the same time
the small ...
DR. WRIGHT: ... aircraft were flying up and down?
1LT JOHNSON: The length ... you know, I figured they were flying
the length of the airfield, so I oriented my movement on them. The
...
DR. WRIGHT: Had you been briefed that they would be in the
air?
1LT JOHNSON: No.
DR. WRIGHT: I haven't talked to anybody yet that knew they
were going to be there. Everybody just recognized them for what
they were and oriented on them.
1LT JOHNSON: I didn't hear any firing. I only heard some movement,
you know, in the general area with people trying to move equipment.
I started moving to the west and crossed over two the heavy drop
platforms that were still there.
DR. WRIGHT: Chem lights on those?
1LT JOHNSON: The first person I run into is SFC Lucas who is
...
DR. WRIGHT: Hold on a second.
[INTERRUPTION]
DR. WRIGHT: You said SFC Lucas?
1LT JOHNSON: He's the battalion operations (S-3) NCO [noncommissioned
officer]. He used to be my platoon sergeant in the scout platoon,
and he was carrying a M-21 sniper system since he was a sniper.
DR. WRIGHT: He was trained on it?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. He had been a sniper in the Marines in
Viet Nam, so he felt comfortable with that. I linked up with him
and we linked up at the fence line and moved south along the fence
and tried to find an opening. I ran into CPT Terhune who at that
time was the CG's [Commanding General's] Aide and one other officer,
at which point we took out a bayonet and cut our way through the
fence.
DR. WRIGHT: The M-9 bayonets, the new bayonets?
1LT JOHNSON: Right.
DR. WRIGHT: And that was capable of cutting through that heavy
gauge [wire]?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: No particular problem?
1LT JOHNSON: None at all. Within our platoon each squad has
two heavy-duty hand-size wire cutters, but in the headquarters [element]
the platoon sergeant and the RTO had them, so I didn't have them.
But we were able to get through the fence and crossed the fence.
CPT Terhune and the other officer went basically to the southwest
and SFC Lucas and I moved more west-northwest. We linked up with
two other people from the battalion. But still I didn't hear any
shots fired or any activity. We then continued to move west, and
just before I reached the airfield I linked up at my platoon sergeant,
SFC Serrano, and when we came out on the airfield, you know, we
saw some elements from the Ranger battalion that were derigging
(I guess) one of their platforms which had hit the airfield. And
we got on the airfield and ran into, I think, the battalion SGM.
Other than that, we didn't really run into anybody within the battalion.The
battalion assembly points were further up the airfield. I had designated
ours in the southern tip of the airfield; normally we'll assemble
on terrain features rather than assembly aids within the platoon.
So, I moved down there with SFC Serrano and linked up with one of
my sniper teams and then slowly the platoon came in.
DR. WRIGHT: Do you have some times on that?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes. We were Gavin-4, which is 90 percent of our
personnel, by 0435.
DR. WRIGHT: So, that is a very rapid assembly?
1LT JOHNSON: Not ...
DR. WRIGHT: Considering the conditions and everybody else's
problems assembling. That's a very quick time, then.
1LT JOHNSON: Considering the conditions. They were really good
on getting in and they all ... no one got misoriented or lost. The
last element to come in came in at 0556, and the only reason it
took them longer was because they were dropped way to the southeast
in some really wet marshy area. They were the first ...
DR. WRIGHT: They were the first ones out of the door, so they
hit the swampy part?
1LT JOHNSON: It took them quite awhile to move up through that.
They didn't get to see the airfield, so they couldn't really orient
their movement on the objective.
DR. WRIGHT: Do you attribute the fact that just the scouts
are far better trained on land navigation and things like that to
being a contributing factor to your quick assembly?
1LT JOHNSON: That would definitely be one, sir, the land nav
training. Also, whenever we jump we do assemble on a terrain feature
rather than on an assembly aid, which ...
DR. WRIGHT: Speeds things up?
1LT JOHNSON: Which is the better way to do it. And then also,
the way we were cross-loaded, the leader was right there with his
personnel, and they all basically assembled as they started moving,
and there was a leader with them.
DR. WRIGHT: So, that speeds the process up too?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes.
DR. WRIGHT: You then get notified, or I guess then you check
in ... when you hit Gavin-4 you check in with battalion and notify
battalion that you are good to go. At that point do they tell you
to move to the PZ [pickup zone]?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. The PZ ... I had moved up several times
to do face-to-face with people that were coming in from the battalion.
And there was ... I wouldn't say there was a lot of confusion, but
just waiting to get instructions on when the air assault was going
to go down. It really wasn't that big of a deal moving to the PZ,
because we were basically right there.
DR. WRIGHT: About what time did the choppers arrive?
1LT JOHNSON: I have 0705 was when we landed at our LZ, sir,
so I would say about 0500 or so.
DR. WRIGHT: Had you practiced [with] seats out before?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. We had ... that was another thing that
led us to the impression that something was up. We received a memorandum,
and we had gone out to Simmons Army Air Field [at Fort Bragg].
DR. WRIGHT: Gone through static training or did they actually
let you ride in them?
1LT JOHNSON: No, it was only static with the seats out. And
they had told us ... I think it was twenty-one [personnel] they
wanted on there. And when we did it static the most we could ...
that we felt safely we could get on with all of the equipment, because
it went out there with all our gear to do the static training, was
twenty. And we came back and told the [S]-3, etc., etc. But in actuality
...
DR. WRIGHT: That morning you found a way to fit extra people?
1LT JOHNSON: The lift that I was on had twenty-three people
on it because we were cross-loaded with companies going into LION.
DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the flight, you fly ... basically lift
off from the airfield from just the southern end of the airfield?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes.
DR. WRIGHT: And then go out over the water and make a run parallel
to the coast but outside effective range?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. We gained altitude by flying to the
north-northwest, and basically orbited back around the airfield
because I think the lead portion of the chalk of ten lifted off
and the trail five were still down there, so he orbited a little
higher and slowed down until he got the entire lift.
DR. WRIGHT: And then he married them up?
1LT JOHNSON: And then we moved basically west along the coastline.
DR. WRIGHT: Did you get a chance then to eyeball the LZ as
you fly by it?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. Almost looked exactly like the video
I had seen.
DR. WRIGHT: Now, which aircraft were you on in that chalk of
ten; do you remember?
1LT JOHNSON: Chalk 4, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: O.K. And as I understand it from the [S]-3, the
first four chalks broke off then--after you had flown past the objective--broke
off and came around to touch down on LION while the rest took a
wider swing to get up to BOBCAT?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: As you're coming in, any firing?
1LT JOHNSON: I didn't notice any when we were on the aircraft
at all, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: So, the gunners weren't firing, your people weren't
firing?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: And you couldn't see anything coming up from the
ground?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir. I was looking closely trying to identify
where the ZPU-4 [Soviet-manufactured heavy machine gun] because
that was the major threat in the area.
[END OF TAPE 1, SIDE 1]
DR. WRIGHT: O.K., resuming with Side 2. As you touched down,
do you have a time hack on touchdown?
1LT JOHNSON: Sir, like I said, 0705.
DR. WRIGHT: And how long does it take you to get off of the
aircraft?
1LT JOHNSON: We were very quick. On that first lift of four,
sir, going into LION, there was no problem because they all came
up on the beach and no one hit ...
DR. WRIGHT: No one hit the mud flats?
1LT JOHNSON: No one on that first lift. And we got off the
aircraft and started moving to the embankment.
DR. WRIGHT: To the embankment?
1LT JOHNSON: The embankment would give us cover until the aircraft
went out, and we heard a few sporadic shots.
DR. WRIGHT: Did you have any air cover at that point, any gunships
escorting?
1LT JOHNSON: There were two [AH-1G] Cobras. I believe one stayed
on station around LION ...
DR. WRIGHT: ... while the other ...
1LT JOHNSON: ... moved up. That's what it appeared to be.
DR. WRIGHT: How long did it take for the second lift to get
in then?
1LT JOHNSON: The two squads that had gone in had already, from
my platoon, had already started moving to the west towards their
OPs. They were, I'd say 200 meters out of Viejo and I had started
moving west. Sir, I'd say--tops--between five to ten minutes until
the next group came in.
DR. WRIGHT: Again four chalks came into LION?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir, all ten on the second lift came into
LION, and that is where I believe the problem occurred with the
mud. Because ...
DR. WRIGHT: Too many aircraft?
1LT JOHNSON: It was just too large of a lift for that size
of an LZ, and that's when we got (I think it was) Charlie Company
and one of the other companies got personnel stuck in the mud.
DR. WRIGHT: And that was a function of guys going out one door
went out into the mud and guys going out the other door pretty much
were safe?
1LT JOHNSON: I'd say for the middle chalks. For the last chalk
the whole aircraft was mud. And I've seen some of the footage from
CNN [Cable News Network], and it looked like actually the aircraft
was temporarily with wheels in the mud.
DR. WRIGHT: Do you provide security as they start trying to
extract the guys from the mud, or was that pretty much left to each
chalk to take care of itself?
1LT JOHNSON: No. As a matter of fact, we ... it is part of
our packing SOPs that each element have a rope, a twenty-foot rope.
None of the companies had a rope, so we gave up one of our ropes
for them to throw out to try to help drag people out of the mud.
The headquarters element attempted to assist, to provide some security;
and I told the other two squads just to move out and man their OPs
[because] they needed to get out there.
DR. WRIGHT: About how long does it take them to get out there
and get their OPs set up?
1LT JOHNSON: They call in that they're position at 0742 for
OP-2 and 0749 for OP-1, which is the northern OP going off ...
DR. WRIGHT: So, you had fairly quick[ly] established communications
with your element that was on BOBCAT then?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Using primarily the [AN/PRC]-77?
1LT JOHNSON: They would use the [AN/PRC]-77. They each had
one there.
DR. WRIGHT: So, in that sense you have good comm[unication]s?
1LT JOHNSON: Oh yes, sir, very good comms.
DR. WRIGHT: It's only at the upper echelons where they are
trying to reach the longer distances that comms become an issue?
1LT JOHNSON: As a matter of fact, towards the end of the day
at .. let's see what time it was ... at 1658 I had moved back from
the western OPs to link up with [battalion] headquarters element
just to get some face-to-face with the S-2 and S-3. And at that
time they tell me that they don't have commo with higher. And each
of our elements would carry an [field] expedient [RC]-292 [antenna]
which we make out of Claymore wire, and the headquarters element
carries the actual head and the wire and the poles you stick together--not
the base poles, but the antenna poles for an actual 292; at which
time we set that up for the headquarters element to use to talk
to higher on FM [radio].
DR. WRIGHT: So, that's when they get on-line back to Tocumen?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Did you secure the objective fairly easily?
1LT JOHNSON: What happened on the OPs. On the western OP, OP-2,
sir, they note a lot of civilian personnel in the area. Some of
the civilians are coming up and telling us--we have a Spanish speaker,
at least one in each squad--that there's P.D.F. here, P.D.F. there.
And the first OP to receive fire was the western one, OP-2, and
they received fire from three personnel in a building that was just
to the north of their OP.
DR. WRIGHT: And that comes about when?
1LT JOHNSON: That was radioed to us at 0804.
DR. WRIGHT: So, it didn't take too long after they were out
there before the P.D.F. starts bringing them under fire?
1LT JOHNSON: That's right, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Do they ... are they able to determine they are
P.D.F. as opposed to dignity battalion guys? Or are there any uniforms
in evidence?
1LT JOHNSON: There were no uniforms. When we were down there,
we didn't see a single Panamanian in uniform. Everyone was wearing
civilian clothes.
DR. WRIGHT: Blue jeans primarily?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: They start taking the fire. Do they return it?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, they returned fire, small arms fire. One
person leaves the building and tries to get to a car, at which time
they fire a [M]-203 round and that pretty much silenced the firing
from them. Then again, in that incident they report that there was
one wounded enemy personnel.
DR. WRIGHT: Is this the guy that you got with the [M]-203 round?
1LT JOHNSON: Correct, sir. And he still had a pistol and wouldn't
surrender it, and wouldn't give up.
DR. WRIGHT: I take it your Spanish speaker out with the OP
is trying to talk him into giving up?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. And we tell him that you have three minutes
to give up that pistol, you know, and surrender yourself. We will
give you First Aid. He was basically getting delirious and everything,
and he starts yelling (as I understand ... from what was reported
to me by the squad). They move up and start applying First Aid;
they took the pistol from him; at which time it was now 0838. A
civilian ambulance shows up and we just let him be taken away in
the civilian ambulance.
DR. WRIGHT: Secured his weapon but ...
1LT JOHNSON: Right. We took the weapon which was later turned
into the Arms Room at Panama Viejo and tagged. Because the weapon
had actually been shot, a round hit the weapon and...
DR. WRIGHT: Caused a discharge?
1LT JOHNSON: ... because it was actually stuck in his hip.
The round had hit the weapon and deformed the metal so that it was
stuck on his body and that's the reason he ...
DR. WRIGHT: He couldn't give it up? O.K., the ... You said
you cleared releasing him to the civilian ambulance.
1LT JOHNSON: With the battalion commander.
DR. WRIGHT: This pretty much now is your first element contact,
and this is kind of what, given that mission, that you had expected
to see: sniper fire and stuff like that, rather than any, you know,
human wave attack coming at you or anything like that?
1LT JOHNSON: Oh, sure. We expected a lot of action being at
the Panama Viejo barracks, which is where all ... the way all of
the companies were oriented at that time. But there wasn't any action
there. You know, I expected the companies and the snipers to be
under the fire, or making a fire on the barracks to clear the barracks.
But in actuality, everything ...
DR. WRIGHT: Everybody was out?
1LT JOHNSON: And it was 180 [degrees different]. And all of
the activity was outside in that area.
DR. WRIGHT: Talk me through the rest of that first day as you
get into the security operation of trying to seal off the peninsula
area.
1LT JOHNSON: O.K. Up to the north at OP-1, almost immediately
after the other OP to the west sends their SALUTE [formatted spot]
report, we get reports of vehicles moving with armed personnel in
small Nissan trucks or vans. Basically that move towards the bridge,
take a look around, and then circle back around through some portion
of the city and then come back and look.
DR. WRIGHT: Your rules of engagement [ROE] say until they fire
you can't fire on them?
1LT JOHNSON: Right, which is another point we have
brought up. Here you're seeing people with AK-[47]s, with
weapons, and you're helpless in firing at them because
they haven't fired at you. And in another incident later
in the day at that western OP they had moved their OP positions
slightly after that first contact; had gotten down and
within twenty meters three more guys came out of a building
and started moving toward Panama Viejo with AKs. They couldn't
fire at them. For a minute they didn't know exactly what
to do and then they had a Spanish speaker tell them to "alto" or
halt, at which time they just basically broke and ran.
Again, that could have been three people which later on
could come back and have gotten somebody else. But that
was slightly frustrating.
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah. It must ... it must, given the way that the
adrenaline is rushing for your younger kids that are first under
[fire], that's got to be a real problem for the squad leaders to
deal with--to keep them from reacting in frustration.
1LT JOHNSON: And I think it's a credit to all the NCOs. I mean,
no one within the platoon had had combat experience prior to that.
And, again, they all maintained rules of engagement and they accomplished
their mission by doing that. I mean, they didn't get caught up in
the excitement either. So that is a credit to their training and
the schooling that has been instilled in the squad leaders in the
platoon.
DR. WRIGHT: As you go through this first day now you've got
contact[s that] start to come in more frequently?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. Again, at 0924 the northern OP receives
sporadic fire. Nothing aimed at them, but sporadic fire which appears
to be going in towards them. They also stop one blue Volkswagen
and they apprehend four personnel with AK-47s and turn them over
to the Charlie Company in that area and they are sent back to be
detained at Panama Viejo.
They also report seeing a turret, what appears to be a portion
of an armored vehicle which was parked up at ... I guess it is still
part of Panama Viejo, but it is north of that first bridge. We attempted
to get an Apache, an AH-64 (which were two of them orbiting within
the vicinity of Panama Viejo), but we didn't have commo with them
for some reason; and [we] tried to talk through both the S-3 and
the battalion commander, and neither of them had commo with them
either.
DR. WRIGHT: Trying ... yeah ... just trying to get somebody
to make a run in and see what it was?
1LT JOHNSON: And the other two contacts we had on the western
OP. One was a police vehicle stopped at the roadblock and we apprehended
four policemen who initially didn't want to ... they wanted to ...
they were trying to run the roadblock, basically. We apprehended
them and their weapons. And the next major action was while those
four were being detained and questioned and tagged, another vehicle
came in (which was a blue Toyota) and four personnel were in that
and they were firing as they went. And they ...
DR. WRIGHT: So that's the first one where you've actually had
the immediate contact where they ... where the vehicle starts firing
at them at that OP?
1LT JOHNSON: Correct, sir. Well, they had the initial firing
from the building.
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, but the first vehicle one?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes. This was at 1013.
DR. WRIGHT: So, it's starting to pick up.
1LT JOHNSON: I am trying to look at my notes. That's what all
the dead space here is. But there was quite a bit of activity from
that 10:00 o'clock period up to about 1300. There were ... there's
basically four ... three different incidences where there are vehicles
attempting to run the roadblock. The bottom line is there is two
enemy KIA [killed in action], two enemy WIA [wounded in action]
which we evacuate, one friendly WIA from Bravo Company which we
evacuate, and some of the equipment taken out of the cars are three
9mm pistols, one 9mm Uzi, one FMLN [Belgian-made rifle], two AK-47s
out of that one car. Another car had three AK-47s with one RPG-18,
a memo book, magazines for Uzis. And I can't remember what the other
car had ... the other car had two AK-47s, one FMLN, extra magazines,
and that was in a white van.
DR. WRIGHT: So, at this point now you are starting to get a
feel for the opposition, that the tenure or ... that the nature
of this one is going to be a lot of heavily armed ... small arms
... drive-by type stuff?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. And one of the biggest things that,
as I move basically along that area from the western OP back towards
the roadblock, with Bravo Company and Charlie Company--sort of a
mixture there holding that roadblock was ... . The biggest thing
that I was concerned about was all of these drive-bys or indiscriminate
firings. They were made that much more difficult due to the fact
that there was 50 to 100 people standing ...
DR. WRIGHT: Standing on the street corner?
1LT JOHNSON: ... on the street. And I kept attempting to call
the battalion commander asking for a loudspeaker system or some
civil affairs personnel.
DR. WRIGHT: To get them ... to get everybody off of your street?
1LT JOHNSON: Right, and to try to explain to them what was
going on because our platoon sergeant spoke Spanish and he attempted
to explain it. He would explain it, and then fifteen or twenty minutes
later they would come back out. That was probably the hardest thing
to try to control that day was, you know, we wanted to present an
image to the people there that you are there to help them, but at
the same time it is ... with all of those people around that you
are most vulnerable because it just takes one person to come out
of that crowd and to initiate something.
DR. WRIGHT: What time did you finally get guidance from the
battalion commander on how to establish the perimeter? And what
is the [S]-2 telling you at this point, because you haven't taken
a lot of people out of the cuartel; you didn't catch a lot
of people in the barracks?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. The [S]-2 and the [S]-3 were up coming
off of BOBCAT, and for quite awhile there we didn't have commo with
them. From what I understand, was [that] they received a lot of
fire, and that Charlie Company and the S-2 and S-3 were sort of
held down on BOBCAT and didn't get a chance to move towards Panama
Viejo. Meanwhile, the other two companies and the battalion commander
which moved from LION, and which moved directly into Panama Viejo,
and they were the ones that determined that the barracks was empty.
And I can't really say--and that is probably the biggest thing that
we could have done better--was to make that determination right
away and reorient ...
DR. WRIGHT: Out instead of in?
1LT JOHNSON: ... out instead of in. And I think that was probably
the biggest error that our--not that it was any one person's fault--it
was just that we had looked at that mission so much and with so
many different contingencies that we just really oriented it out
and a lot of people that were getting the activity were the OPs
that were oriented out.
DR. WRIGHT: As dusk starts coming up, has everything settled
down at that point so that you can start getting more manpower out
on your OPs, so that they're not the only ones sitting out there?
1LT JOHNSON: What occurs is our last incident is at 1757 up
at the northern OP. They seize a white van and take two POWs that
had AKs in the van. And by 1820 we got the whole platoon linked
back up within the perimeter, trying to determine what is going
to be the orientation for that night's mission. And by 1930, the
platoons are basically back out pretty much--not in their same OPs.
The one that was OP-2 going to the west did not go as far down the
beach line to man that intersection. He was about half way between
the battalion perimeter and the original OP. And the same with the
one to the north. They didn't go all the way up to the bridge. There
was an open field basically half-way between the distance from Panama
Viejo barracks to that bridge that they manned that evening.
DR. WRIGHT: So, in essence your night positions, your LPs [listening
posts] are really, like, by doctrine have pulled in tighter than
the OP line was out?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. Doctrinally, looking back at it now, we
should have made the realization that those OPs could have (probably
should have) been manned by the platoon and companies manning that
battalion perimeter. And we should have been oriented further out,
either doing mounted patrols with ... or I guess we didn't have
vehicles at that time.
DR. WRIGHT: But the vehicles were available from field expedient
means had you really needed them?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. It would have been more of a risk to push
out that night and to make a presence, but I think in the long-run
that would have deterred a whole lot more the activity with the
Panamanians that did filter back into the populace and did come
back out.
DR. WRIGHT: When did you get the alert to chop some people
to support the move to the Marriott Hotel?
1LT JOHNSON: Again, sir, that came out at approximately 19:30.
I've got it logged here where we had two men used to help secure
the Medivac [medical evacuation] vehicle which would be driven ...
DR. WRIGHT: That was that white van?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, driven by ... it's either PFC or SPC Lucas
from the battalion S-3 shop and SPC Juarez, whose from our platoon,
was the shotgun person who rode next to him. The other man, a SPC
Kelly, who was also picked--pulled in off the OP to do that mission--was
not used.
DR. WRIGHT: The two of them, as I understand it, were to trail
the column and pick up any WIA's that occurred and to keep shuttling
them back to Panama Viejo.
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: There is the initial firefight shortly after the
column departs the perimeter where you have the drive-through by
the truck, and they stop that. MAJ Chase is wounded in that action
and your vehicle picks him up and brings him back into the perimeter?
1LT JOHNSON: Again, sir, I was not there, and the only person
I had involved was SPC Juarez. Other than actually seeing the tracers
and everything, and the reports coming in from that western OP,
of a medical vehicle coming back into the battalion perimeter, I
don't know if Major Chase was on that lift or ... .
DR. WRIGHT: O.K. As you have maybe better commo do than other
people do within the battalion, are you able to monitor the progress
of that column and the battalion commander as they push on down
to the hotel?
1LT JOHNSON: We are monitoring battalion command [net], and
the ... . Truthfully I don't recall that much on transmissions because
at that point my platoon sergeant and I were switching on and off
to get some rest. And ...
DR. WRIGHT: Trying to get into your sleep plan? In the morning
do you get involved in the ground movement down there, the relief
movement?
1LT JOHNSON: With Delta Company? No, sir. Again, we manned
the OPs through the night and into the morning. And then at 0922
we received a frago [fragmentary order] to go 'get eyes on' a school
which is up near the northern OP. There had been some activity,
vehicles driving in within that area, and we felt that the sporadic
shots that were fired at that northern OP were also fired from that
school. So we moved out on that mission with two squads and a sniper
team. And they left out--passed the Charlie Company lines--at 10:20,
and were in position at 10:46. And there was a report that the area
is clear all the way up until 11:22 when they started receiving
pretty heavy automatic weapons fire from that school building. It
was a two-story building with, you know, like designer cinder blocks
that had the holes in them.
DR. WRIGHT: Have the holes in them?
1LT JOHNSON: So you couldn't identify personnel, but there
were shots coming from that area. And not particularly well aimed,
but going into that OP.
DR. WRIGHT: Did they return fire or ... ?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: ROE says if you can't see them, you can't shoot
at them?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes. We pulled off that area, and the OP, and
they moved back to south [and] sent a reactionary force. Because
we had planned for a reactionary force from Delta Company, which
at the time they did have a vehicle, so I guess the vehicles showed
up some time that day, if I remember correctly.
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah. I was under the impression that they had
gotten in pretty much the first night, or something like that.
1LT JOHNSON: But at 1142, the element that had received fire
had moved back to the south with the Delta Company reactionary force.
The vehicles made their presence known out there, and there wasn't
any fire on them. So we pulled all of those elements back in.
DR. WRIGHT: Did not sweep the school?
1LT JOHNSON: No, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: As we continue through on the 21st, pretty much
the same-same as the day before? Drive-by ... isolated drive-by
incidents?
1LT JOHNSON: Right, sir. Well, other than that firing, there
was no activity on the OPs; none on the western activity and just
that one incident on that one.
DR. WRIGHT: Did you get any guidance at this point about starting
to take more aggressive patrolling thing and start using your people
to start pushing out further?
1LT JOHNSON: That was a big issue. I know that I had talked
personally with the S-2 because we're both lieutenants and were
very good friends. And we really didn't have a good feel for what
was the higher mission that ... we sort of felt ... what came into
our minds was that, you know, the battalion is under constraints
not to go in and appear like it was seizing Panama City. So, we
just thought ...
DR. WRIGHT: So, it makes life difficult?
1LT JOHNSON: We thought we were on the constraints just to
maintain that minimal ...
DR. WRIGHT: The presence of the military objectives as opposed
to civilian objectives?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. That was the perception that was in
our minds. Now, looking back at it, it seemed so stupid that we
didn't get out and get more aggressive, and push-out. I think that's
what was in our mind that we thought was constraining us. But we
had discussed that and that night we received a frago to man the
OPs and we also knew that there were some snipers in the different
positions around Panama Viejo. And it wasn't ...
DR. WRIGHT: Are your snipers at this point being used primarily
for their recon, their long-range vision stuff, as opposed to being
told to ... if you see somebody walking around with a weapon, drop
him.
1LT JOHNSON: Well, again, because the rules of engagement they
couldn't fire initially.
DR. WRIGHT: But they are, because of their vision devices,
are a significant recon asset?
1LT JOHNSON: Right, sir. But the way we had repositioned them
to actually put them in the rooms up on the top part of the room
so that they could fire down the two major avenues if there was
some sort of drive-by activity which had been occurring the day
prior.
DR. WRIGHT: Talk me now through the successive days. As you
finally do start moving into the urban patrols, how are the scouts
employed?
1LT JOHNSON: On the 22d, the first activity we have is again
... it's basically at the time that we were receiving another frago,
it's at 0800. Snipers had been in position on the major ruins pointing
into the east, and they ... reports from them and from Charlie Company
of movement on the other side of that small inlet, of activity and
people moving in Ghillie suits. Snipers engaged ...
DR. WRIGHT: O.K., now at this point, the unit that had been
since the October coup residing at Panama Viejo in the barracks
area was part of the U.E.S.A.T. [Unidad Especial de Anti-Terror]?
1LT JOHNSON: Correct.
DR. WRIGHT: And at this point, now, since we didn't catch them
in the barracks, you are now concerned that of all the people who
were sniper trained and etc., etc., etc., within the Panamanian
Army, they're still out there someplace and ... . Are you being
concerned that, you know, quality trained sniper force ... your
guys could start really taking some losses?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. And that is what Charlie Company had
recorded: that they saw two snipers. That's when I immediately shifted
all of my sniper teams over to orient to the west.
DR. WRIGHT: Using snipers to counter snipers?
1LT JOHNSON: Correct. And two of the snipers said they saw
movement of possibly two personnel, and they attempted to engage,
at which time I moved over there, because there was this ... everything
is within a few hundred meters.
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, it's not a big deal--like you had to walk
a long distance.
1LT JOHNSON: And it wasn't that I was micromanaging or trying
to exercise some control, but I wanted to get over and get a feel
for what was going on. And two of the snipers said they had seen
movement, but could not specifically identify targets. They had
fired at the movement which ... they didn't have any confirmed kills.
And, again, we waited and saw some more movement. They fired some
more. I felt that we were not having conclusive results, so I called
the fire mission from the mortars over on that area. And ...
DR. WRIGHT: The battalion 60[mm]s ... the company 60[mm]s
as opposed to the battalion 81[mm]s?
1LT JOHNSON: The battalion 81[mm]s, right. They fired seven
rounds--a fire-for-effect mission.
DR. WRIGHT: All HE?
1LT JOHNSON: Correct. At which time I requested to go over
there and recon and see if there were any KIAs. I never got over
there that day. We went over in that area two days later and the
people in the civilian area said that an ambulance or something
had come and picked up. The people were saying ten bodies, but I
find that suspect--not to be totally accurate. When we went through
and swept the area we found one bush hat which was not of US make,
and one other piece of Army solid green clothing, but no blood marks
or traces. It was basically inconclusive as to whether we ...
DR. WRIGHT: Actually got anybody or not. But whatever ... in
effect you did suppress whatever they were trying to do because
they broke it off?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. But on that same day is when we first began
our movement out. And it's at 1730 we had one squad with the sniper
were told to move, were given the mission to recon out into this
place which they call the slum area of Panama Viejo where all the
people are. And as soon as we crossed the battalion perimeter is
exactly when the 4th [Battalion] of the 325[th Infantry] comes driving
in, with subsequent fire fight which involved pretty much friendly
fire, or at least as far as what I saw.
DR. WRIGHT: How long did that last?
1LT JOHNSON: Again, I've logged the fire fight starting under
the same entry at 1730, and it ended--I would say ... the next entry
I have logged is at 1800 when the Delta Company vehicle went forward
to extract that one squad that I had sent out as a reaction. Because
what had happened was [the] TOC [tactical operations center] was
pretty much in the same area where that squad went into Panama Viejo
from the passage of lines, and we thought all of that fire initially
was because they had gone into that area. And that's when the ...
I called Delta Company for the reactionary force, because we coordinated
with them for the reactionary force as we usually do. And I thought
that was what was drawing the fire until 4/325 came into the perimeter.
And it took us thirty minutes to sort out and go out and get them.
They hadn't received any accurate fire. It was just probably fire
coming from the battalion perimeter from what we know now. Of course,
then ....
I would say, in answer to your question, the fire fight I would
say lasted ... I would say five to ten minutes.
DR. WRIGHT: Max, yeah. It was not ... in other words, we aren't
talking about guys cooking off basic loads worth of stuff?
1LT JOHNSON: No, no, no. It was ... and again ... and you hate
to point out when there's an error, but that was probably just poor
fire discipline on the part of most of the battalion because almost
the entire battalion perimeter started firing.
DR. WRIGHT: But at this point also, I mean in mitigating circumstances,
we haven't taken the heavy number of POWs [prisoners of war] we
had anticipated. And the rumors are still starting to fly about
the Christmas human wave attacks and stuff like that, so ... .
1LT JOHNSON: I've got two logs here in the entry, you know,
of where higher reports of people massing around the school bus
scene, and people ...
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, and the dignity battalions are ...
1LT JOHNSON: ... it all added to it. Although we can't use
that as an excuse.
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah, it's ... it's ... but it's ... circumstances
under which it happens. Yeah.
When does it start calming down? As you ... as you are actually
able on the 23d, 24th to really get out into the community, that
it starts calming down?
1LT JOHNSON: I would ... I am trying to just review what exactly
happened on the 23d and 24th.
I'd say the first ... the 23d we did not go back out onto the city.
The 24th was the first day where we started moving again through
Panama Viejo. And the way we did it then was a squad would move
basically in front of a rifle company, with the PSYOPS [psychological
operations loud]speaker vehicle; just moving through and telling
them here ...
DR. WRIGHT: Not to worry?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. And just checking for P.D.F. and etc.,
etc., and wishing them a Merry Christmas, and this, that and the
other thing. And I would say at the end of the 24th we had taken
that first step where, mentally at least, people in my platoon had
started to make that transition from combat operations to stability
...
DR. WRIGHT: Stability operations.
1LT JOHNSON: ... operations.
DR. WRIGHT: Had you had a chance to train on that at all, or
was that pretty much 'this was a learn-as-you-go thing?' When did
you take the face paint off; do you remember?
1LT JOHNSON: I believe we took it off--I'd say somewhere around
the 25th or 26th, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: And then on instructions coming down the chain
of command as opposed to your own initiative?
1LT JOHNSON: Yeah, we wouldn't take it off without them saying
we could, but I think maybe some ideas filtered up from us.
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah. As you get out into the ... start running
your patrols out through the community, what ... what's your reaction
to the population? How are they responding to us?
1LT JOHNSON: Initially they are all very glad to see you, and
no one is ... presents any kind of animosity towards us or even
looks at us scornfully for being there. They all seemed very happy
and also very willing to want to come forward and give you information.
But the one thing that we noticed within the platoon was that it's
always the women that came forward and gave you information. Very
rarely would you have an old man, or a male of any age, come forward
to give you information. It was always women that would come up
and point their finger: 'my neighbor over here has got two M-203s
and SAW.' And you'd go in and find them.
DR. WRIGHT: Were you prepared at all for how heavily armed
that country is? I mean, excluding the military stuff, just the
fact that every Tom, Dick and Harry was armed to the teeth?
1LT JOHNSON: Again, I would have to say, sir, that we really
didn't know what to expect from the civilians.
DR. WRIGHT: Just a little bit overwhelmed by the sheer numbers
of weapons that start coming in?
1LT JOHNSON: Right, sir. You don't anticipate pulling away
pillows from a couch and finding an Uzi laying under there.
[LAUGHTER]
DR. WRIGHT: Did you get involved at all in the 'muskets for
money' program?
1LT JOHNSON: The only ... our mission as it began to evolve
... on the 25th, was the first day I think, that we worked with
Delta Company vehicles. But we would move basically--I'm sure MAJ
Chase briefed you--he broke down the whole battalion sector into
areas that would be covered on a specific day. And my platoon and
one platoon from Delta Company with their vehicles would basically
moved through the battalion's ...
DR. WRIGHT: Do the preliminary check?
1LT JOHNSON: Right. And the only way that we became involved
in the 'muskets for money' was if someone turned something in to
us, we would write them a receipt that they could take to that area
and turn it in.
DR. WRIGHT: So, in that sense that became more a function of
the line companies having to do [it]. Because they move slower?
And the battalion kept you and Delta because of your special capabilities,
sort of buffered off from getting down with handing on MREs [Meals,
Ready-to-Eat] and the other stuff.
1LT JOHNSON: But we did take in quite a few weapons because
we would be the first one showing up in a neighborhood. And I hope
this doesn't take it wrong for someone that's listening, but I just
think by the nature of the soldier that gets assigned to a scout
platoon or even the ones in the Delta a little bit, I'm not going
to say, you know, [that] they are more dedicated, but they will
do a job more thoroughly than an average soldier in a rifle company.
And I think the amount of time and effort we put into clearing a
sector basically produced almost twice as many weapons as when a
the company did go through a sector. I think the companies--when
everyone was still at mind set [of] five days and you're out--I
think the companies then saw 'O.K., the task is to finish a sector
and then we're out, so they ...
DR. WRIGHT: So they did it as fast as humanly possible?
1LT JOHNSON: I am not saying they did it ...
DR. WRIGHT: Intentionally they did a sloppy job, yeah. But
I think quality of soldier is a legitimate distinction there. And
that maybe in situations like this, the scout/Delta combination
is in fact maybe the economy of force measure to use.
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. Oh, very much. Due to the mobility provided
by Delta Company vehicles, the fire power provided by their [M-2]
.50-cal[iber machine gun]s, and then the ability to operate very
small units--the scout platoon is used to doing--and all of the
communications.
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah. But it's just a natural marriage that gives
you in essence almost the same ... if, by pairing you guys up this
way, gives you almost the same effect that you get with the MPs
with their gun vehicles and the fact that everybody has got a radio
and stuff like that. It just makes up for a shortfall in MPs. Obviously,
this is never something that appeared on your platoon METL [mission-essential
task list].
1LT JOHNSON: Definitely not.
DR. WRIGHT: Will that in the future?
1LT JOHNSON: What we did at the ITC initially after the operation,
sir, was to do an actual an link-up with the Delta vehicles at night--just
to be more in tune with actually linking up with them; getting on
and off the vehicles quickly, quietly and securely.
And as far as the urban portion, we went back and ... we have a
written platoon SOP and we sort of did the same thing we did when
we first wrote that SOP two years ago, which was 'can go to the
MOUT [training] site [at Fort Bragg]' and start from ground zero.
How do we want to walk through an urban terrain securely, assign
the sectors of observation and fire, break contact drill, etc. And
what we had hoped to do was to progress up to actually doing a lot
of fire/break contact, but (this is something we included in our
AAR, I think) the facilities on post--we can't live-fire in the
MOUT.
Plus, there is a disadvantage as we cited earlier. The only live
fire in an urban terrain you can get is the close combat course
which I think is Range 64, which is I sort of canned--a real canned
scenario. There is the so-called assault building, which is just
one building. Again you're limited to doing just a clearing operation.
And we attempted, as I understand it, at Mott Lake the SF [special
forces] have a real good urban area that you can live fire into,
but that's ...
DR. WRIGHT: Too hard to get into, yeah. What I'm almost hearing
from you is that maybe we need to have almost an urban equivalent
of NTC [National Training Center]. Not necessarily that big, but
I mean something with that degree of realism to it?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. Or even just slight changes to the present
MOUT City, in providing distractors: signs, more color. When you
go inside the buildings--and, you know, this is probably stuff that
can all be done by engineer units on post. Build some interior portions
so that there are closets to be checked, stowaways in attics. Because
when you get into the operations that we were doing, if someone
were to say there's something in that house, it's easy to clear
a house of any personnel, but to actually search and clear a house
with delicate furniture and a TV--you don't want to go in there
knocking stuff around either, but then again you want to be very
thorough, because it means ...
DR. WRIGHT: Lives are at stake, yeah. Yeah, so that's a great
observation. In terms of the dispersion that you get into, does
that become a problem? Or is that not a problem for you because
you have got squads that are used to working just with radio commo
with you?
1LT JOHNSON: Oh, yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: So, that didn't affect you as much as it might
have affected line companies?
1LT JOHNSON: Not at all. I mean, at times I would split up,
pull the vehicles and we would be operating from a distance. It
would depend on the type of urban ... because we pushed all the
way out to, out towards ... past the racetrack, the horse racetrack
into the east of Panama Viejo. On the latter days of the operation
when the battalion had finished its sector pretty much, but they
sent us back out just to provide a continued presence.
DR. WRIGHT: You walked through the area?
1LT JOHNSON: We centralized [a] reactionary force from Delta
Company, and then we'd push out as much as we can to provide ...
DR. WRIGHT: Just did street patrol type things? Cop on the
beat kind of thing, rather than ... yeah. When did you get the word
about redeployment? I mean, obviously the rumor mill starts like
on the afternoon of D-Day.
1LT JOHNSON: Exactly, sir, I don't know. I've got it logged
a couple of times when we do our preliminary lay-out to check for
anything that shouldn't be taken back. And I can't ...
DR. WRIGHT: Of course, I am sure your NCOs are filling your
head with the NCO-channel stories about well, so and so talked to
so and so back at brigade who talked to so and so, you know, knew
somebody over at SOUTHCOM [US Southern Command] or whatever, and
this is when ... and you are getting all of that rumor stuff.
1LT JOHNSON: Again, this is pure credit to the NCOs that I
have had the opportunity to work with in the scout platoon. We sat
down and we said, well, we are obviously not just here for five
days. And we will continue to do our mission and, you know, we just
need to make the best of the opportunity. We asked them if we could
... we found some Zodiac boats and we asked them if we could go
out and do Zodiac boat training, and we asked them if we could do
rappelling training because they had that tall tower and we had
actually set up a rope system to get people up there for sniper
positions. And we asked them if we could set up a live fire range.
All that was sort of shot down, but we were able to do other training.
We did ... just from the plants around there we cooked up what
we call survival meals or something like that. So, we were ... I
don't think we suffered as badly as most other people.
DR. WRIGHT: Because you kept yourselves occupied?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Speaking of food, did you go MRE's to the wall,
or did you start supplementing with warm food that you got that
you could ... you could police up?
1LT JOHNSON: When we go in, we ... the nature of our platoon
is that we just go with one MRE per day. So, initially food wasn't
a problem for us, because that's the way we train. After we came
back towards Panama Viejo, I'd say around the 25th or so, they had
opened up a storeroom in the barracks and each unit was given it's
provisions from there. So, we supplemented with canned ham or whatever
was there.
DR. WRIGHT: Could you get fresh fruit and stuff like that from
the locals?
1LT JOHNSON: We did purchase some fresh fruit and then ...
DR. WRIGHT: Cokes and stuff like that?
1LT JOHNSON: Some cokes the same way. We had to make ... we
didn't drive up in ...
DR. WRIGHT: And go hunting for them?
1LT JOHNSON: Right, sir. Also, you know, within the platoon,
some of the dried stuffs that were in the barracks, and stuff that
other people wouldn't have used, we took the opportunity to try
it. You know, we used it ...
[END OF TAPE 1]
DR. WRIGHT: [Resuming with Side 3, you were talking about]
being able to supplement the rations and ... my, sort of, initial
reaction to that is 'that's kind of what scouts are expected to
do.' So, I mean, this was good opportunity training then?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: The reaction of your people when you actually go
get--what is it--I guess about the 8th of January is when you get
told that, yeah, definite lock-down, division is going home, we're
going to get to jump back in?
1LT JOHNSON: Again, sir, based on all of the rumors that had
been going around, I don't think there was any real ... look around
... everybody figures, you know, maybe we'll get to go this time.
I think even ... or at least the joke within the platoon was: when
we had gone down to JOTC [Jungle Operations Training Center] the
previous March, we were scheduled to leave on this one chalk that
actually didn't take off, maybe something will happen and we'll
fly back to Panama. It basically took us two days to get back. So,
even after we got to the hangers we were ...
DR. WRIGHT: You were not ... I mean, you were just able to
keep morale up by going, well, 'when it happens it happens?'
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. I just don't think that we were so focused
on getting home. I think, again, thanks to the standard of training
that the NCOs had been given ... you know, just by nature of the
82d Division.
DR. WRIGHT: When you turn over the AO [area of operations],
who do you turn it over to?
1LT JOHNSON: The 7th Infantry Division. I can't remember exactly
what battalion sent an LNO [liaison officer]. But in reality I think
it came down to just one platoon when we were leaving.
DR. WRIGHT: So you did not have to get involved in any kind
of face to face for a hand-off of the AO?
1LT JOHNSON: None at all. I was within the TOC locations occasionally
when the LNOs were there, but no personal responsibilities.
DR. WRIGHT: And then you rolled back to Tocumen. [By] ground
convoy?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. We moved out at 0930 on the 10th.
DR. WRIGHT: Get back there, spent about a day and a half rigging
and cleaning equipment, going through the series of inspections
to get cleared by customs, and what not?
1LT JOHNSON: Uh-huh. Things I've got listed are: we turned
in ammo at that point; uniforms (we had been given a new set of
uniforms and we had to either turn that in or our old uniform--it
was the same type); the battalion commander spoke to us; the brigade
commander even spoke to us. Customs inspection ...
DR. WRIGHT: Load out on [C]-141s to come back. Was the flight back
fairly uneventful?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. Nothing ...
DR. WRIGHT: Just everybody got on and went to sleep?
1LT JOHNSON: I would say there was definitely more talking and
stuff going on coming back in than ...
DR. WRIGHT: Going down? [LAUGHTER] You come in over Sicily
[Drop Zone]. Do you expect the hoopla and the fanfare that
takes place?
1LT JOHNSON: We had been prepared. We knew that there was something.
Actually, I think everybody was expecting the President to be there.
That was like the big rumor that was going around, you know, sort
of like we waste an hour getting assembled in formation and march
up there, and it's like 'the President's not ... . It was sort of
a let-down, I think--if you could say there was a let-down that
day. Everybody was just glad to get home.
DR. WRIGHT: As you came out the door could you--where were you
over Sicily?
1LT JOHNSON: I was on chalk 9, number one, right door so I had
a perfect view, so ...
DR. WRIGHT: You saw the whole thing? Could you hear the crowd?
1LT JOHNSON: Not when I was coming down, but when we were marching.
DR. WRIGHT: Everybody assembles on the DZ? You get off a good jump?
1LT JOHNSON: Oh, beautiful, perfect. It's just ... it's the one
you dream about, you know, no cloud in the sky and all of those
parachutes ... daylight ... .
DR. WRIGHT: Assemble together. What's your assembly aid on Sicily?
The colors?
1LT JOHNSON: Each battalion stuck up their assembly aid, but everybody
was just running around. There were so many people it was just chaos.
DR. WRIGHT: Form up; the flags are unfurled; and you do the march
up to the bleacher area. And then what? Released there or ... I
mean there's families all over the place. Is that how it's done?
Is it release there, or do you have to go back to the battalion
area and do turn-in?
1LT JOHNSON: You are not released there. You have to go back to
the battalion. The wives within our platon are fairly close and
pretty much the whole platoon is, so they were all sitting together
under one sign.
DR. WRIGHT: And you could spot ... ?
1LT JOHNSON: We all got there and then we all basically stayed
ten--I'd say almost twenty minutes. Then I said, hey, let's get
all back on transport so we can all really get home.
DR. WRIGHT: And spent what a couple of hours doing equipment turn-in,
securing the weapons and stuff like that?
1LT JOHNSON: It didn't take long at all, really.
DR. WRIGHT: And then got home that night?
1LT JOHNSON: Pretty much that afternoon, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: Then did the battalion get block leave at all?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir, we did. A week.
DR. WRIGHT: And then came back and it was, oh, well, that's all
behind you and now let's get back to serious training?
1LT JOHNSON: Well, get back to training, but again that's one thing
that we didn't want to lose; lessons that we had learned. We took
time and really wrote up a pretty substantial AAR which we got here.
I have already noticed some ... one change come out of it. It was
very minor point to put on the tape, but on the PRC-126 the little
display panel is in green plastic. The idea behind that is so that
it reduces the amount of light when you hit the display light at
night. But in actuality, it makes it very hard to read any time
either during the day or night. We have been trying to do this for
awhile, but we just included in this after action report and that's
what brought about the changes and everything. Now there is just
clear plastic.
DR. WRIGHT: But those are really the critical fixes--are the little
things.
1LT JOHNSON: The little things.
DR. WRIGHT: In terms of platoon reaction to patch on the right
shoulder, the gold star on the jump wings--positive thing?
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. And again--and this is going back to another
thing which sort of went on when we were still at Panama Viejo--was
the whole thing about awards. You know, that is sort of one thing
that left a bitter taste within our platoon was--at least the way
we felt was--they kept pushing the command for the names of people
we wanted to get a bronze star and all this, that, and the other
thing. And the only person we turned in was the one man we had wounded
on the Marriott evac[uation].
And we felt, you know, even though on the first few days the first
three squads received the initial brunt of what the battalion faced--and
it was just three days. We didn't feel ... we felt that the medal
should represent exactly what it stands for, whereas on the other
side of the coin ... I would say the rest of the battalion was (I
won't say being generous), but that's how we felt they were being
generous.
And then when we got back here, that's where it was continued.
We weren't overly obsessed [with] 'when are they going to have the
formation' because originally they had told us that we'd have it
before block leave, so we ... .
I just think way back in Panama Viejo I made the realization that
we did our job, we did it O.K., and we brought everybody back. You
read about the guy in World War I or World War II that low-crawled
up to a bunker and captured twenty-four people or ...
DR. WRIGHT: Yeah. There was no opportunity to do Alvin York down
there, yeah.
1LT JOHNSON: Or anything even close, so ... .
DR. WRIGHT: But, now, your one man who was the shotgun on the Marriott
run Medivac vehicle--that got pretty intense for those two guys
for awhile.
1LT JOHNSON: Very much. And they continued to go back. And there
was another person on a vehicle who refused after the first run
... who refused to get back on the vehicle to provide security.
Those two soldiers took that extra step, and that is the reason
that we felt that he deserved it.
DR. WRIGHT: Did he actually get his ... did they approve?
1LT JOHNSON: He had an ARCOM [Army Commendation Medal], which was
very justly deserved.
DR. WRIGHT: In terms of the other stuff, the Armed Forces Expeditionary
[Medal] ribbon, the CIBs [Combat Infantryman's Badge], and what
not, how was that handled? Did that come down on blanket orders
or what?
1LT JOHNSON: Eventually we had the awards ceremony on the 22d or
21st of February, and we received blanket orders for a CIB with
everybody's name listed. And at that point the division commander
just made a decision ... and they only got the orders from the CIB
done, but go ahead with the gold star [for the jump wings], and
combat patch.
DR. WRIGHT: And paperwork will catch up, which is in fact
what happens?
1LT JOHNSON: We got the orders for the CIB and the combat star,
but the ...
DR. WRIGHT: Patch is done by a DA [Department of the Army] order.
It just lists units, and if you were with the unit you do it. The
same way with the ribbon. That's how that's done. You will never
see individual [orders] on that.
In retrospect, what in your OBC [officer basic course] training
prepared you for what you actually ran into on JUST CAUSE? What
... you know, as you have had time to reflect on it, what do you
think really turns out to have been the critical thing that got
you sort of locked in?
1LT JOHNSON: This is a terrible thing to say, but from OBC I can't
think of anything. But if ... I would say the requirement for pressure
from OBC for you to go to Ranger school. Ranger school was probably
the ...
DR. WRIGHT: That's a very valid comment to make. The more of that
individual 'pressure' training you get, the more it prepares you
for what you are going to ... for that 'face of battle' that you
run into.
1LT JOHNSON: I guess you're correct, sir, because the whole orientation
seemed like in basic course, was to prepare you physically and somewhat
tactically to go to Ranger school.
DR. WRIGHT: That and having the wisdom to pick good NCOs? Because
you repeated over and over again that your NCOs ...
1LT JOHNSON: They were there when I got there, sir, except for
SFC Serrano, who happened to also be my rifle platoon sergeant when
I was a rifle platoon leader. He came over. And I didn't ... if
I had to pick, I would pick him, but you know ... . Again the training
that they have been through (we're all Ranger qualified, every NCO
in the platoon is) makes such a tremendous difference. Because it
breeds within themselves ... when they come back and they all start
working towards the standard, and they understand the standard.
DR. WRIGHT: So, that then becomes an internalized thing within
... a scout platoon, in any battalion, is usually your elite platoon.
But internalization of the notion of standards and always train
to the standards becomes the critical thing in making that platoon
function.
1LT JOHNSON: Yes, sir. To set the standard and then to uphold it
with no exceptions. You know, not using the standard as a hacksaw
or hatchet to get rid of people either, but to use it as something
that, you know, it is your responsibility to develop your subordinates
up to that standard because we have proven that it is attainable,
you've attained it. Makes you have a very good platoon.
DR. WRIGHT: I've been asking everybody this one question. What
is the single most humorous, strange, unusual, weird thing that
happened to you during the operation? The one thing that you'll
carry to your grave as that indelible impression of Panama? I've
had guys tell me it's things like a bizarre incident that happened
on the street or something like that where somewhere they were anticipating
tension and pressure and it turned out to be humor, stuff like that.
1LT JOHNSON: The only thing that I can think of that is sort
of humorous offhand, sir, was one of the things that we had
also done was to build our own shower. You know, we had this
dark bucket that could pick up some water. And we used a soccer
goal with ponchos up the cover of everything inland, and facing
out to the ocean it was open. And then one time some guy was
taking a shower and using this thing and there was about six
UH-60s with all of the Congressmen flying by. [LAUGHTER]
DR. WRIGHT: That's it. That's the kind of story I'm looking for.
Any other thing that I, in my negligence, failed to ask that you
think is really something to stick in your mind, or that you'd like
to get onto the tape?
1LT JOHNSON: Can I look through this AAR a little bit?
DR. WRIGHT: Sure. Let me kill this a little bit.
[INTERRUPTION]
DR. WRIGHT: O.K., resuming. Lieutenant, did you have a chance to
come up with that one thought?
1LT JOHNSON: The title?
DR. WRIGHT: Well, the one thought on anything that I have forgotten.
1LT JOHNSON: Just to sum it up, if you will, what you do down there
is what you've done in training. You won't act any differently.
DR. WRIGHT: The battle drills really paid off and things like that?
1LT JOHNSON: Exactly. Just like everyone says--it's true, sir.
DR. WRIGHT: What about that little off-the-tape question I asked
you about. What's the chapter title you'd come up with for 2nd Battalion's
sweep through Panama Viejo? Nothing really hits you?
1LT JOHNSON: The only thing was, you know, the enemy wasn't
really there in the barracks you know. "Where was
the P.D.F.?"
DR. WRIGHT: O.K. That's a good one. I appreciate it. Thanks a lot,
sir.
[END OF INTERVIEW]
